A folk theorem for repeated matching games is established that holds if the stage game is not a pure coordination game. It holds independent of population size and for all matching rules-including rules that depend on players choices or the history of play. This paper also establishes an equilibrium condition and using this discovers two di¤erences between the equilibria of repeated matching games and standard repeated games. Trigger strategies are not equilibria and there is no simple optimal penal code.
Introduction
It is well established that a small group-which is committed to interacting in the futurecan overcome its members' incentives to act sel…shly and cooperate. However, situations with this type of commitment are rare in economics. For example, consumers usually choose a supplier each time they buy a good. Can the consumers' and suppliers' short term incentives to not pay their bills and provide low quality be overcome? This paper shows they can be if people know each other's reputation.
The model used in this analysis is a repeated matching game. This paper is the …rst to extensively compare this game with the more familiar standard repeated game. After developing the equilibrium condition, two key di¤erences between the set of equilibria in standard repeated games and repeated matching games are illustrated. In this model simple optimal penal codes (Abreu [1] ) and trigger strategies are not equilibria.
This research builds on the work of Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite [ [18] OFP hereafter] and Kandori [15] in repeated matching games. OFP formalized the strategies used in this literature and showed that cooperation could be achieved with a continuum of buyers and sellers. Kandori extended these results to …nite populations matched randomly. Here I generalize Kandori [15] to games where players choose whom to be matched with and to interactions with more than two participants.
As an example of the general model consider a day labor market. Every morning employers show up, and select several people from the laborers present to work for the day. The results here allow the employers to choose who they want to work for them-as long as they choose fewer than some upper bound. Two restrictions are that there is no excess supply of jobs or workers and all employers and employees are nearly the same.
In Kandori [15] random matching was required but it is hard to imagine a realistic example of either market where all matching is random. As will be shown if even one player can choose who to interact with then the strategies used in Kandori [15] fail. This might seem odd since players are basically the same, but after people deviate players are di¤erent. Someone who just cheated will have to be punished and employers may prefer to hire someone else.
The equilibria will be social norms (OFP [18] ). These strategies are based on players' social status (or reputation). Given the social status of the people interacting a social standard of behavior tells them what action to take today, and then the transition rule updates the social status of players depending on what she and the people she is interacting with have done in the past. These strategies will have to be sequential equilibria, and they also satisfy several other restrictions.
These further restrictions are motivated by the fact that the equilibria only use local information processing (OFP [18] ). A strategy uses local information processing if it only uses information that the players involved in an interaction should know. Social norms only use what a player and the people she interacts with have done in the past, and thus satisfy this restriction. Without this restriction a strategy might require a great deal of knowledge on the part of players, an amount that would easily be untenable in a large society. Due to this restriction Hasker [14] shows that cooperation can be sustained by players sending messages back and forth, without any other source of information. Given this restriction, should something be considered an equilibrium if too much information causes it to break down? If information sources such as newspapers have to be ruled out to make a strategy an equilibrium the equilibrium is not interesting. Local information processing was required to be certain the strategy didn't require too much information, straightforward (Kandori [15] ) is required to make certain that the strategy doesn't require that players have too little information. It makes certain that there is no value to this extra information by requiring that players would do the same thing even if they had full information.
The motivation for the …nal restriction on the set of equilibria is based on the same principal. Surely we don't want to require our players to know the way everyone decides who to interact with? And what is the di¤erence between requiring them to interact with one group of people forever and always using a certain matching rule? Clearly the di¤erence is philosophical, in both cases an untenable amount of commitment is required. Thus it seems an equilibrium of a repeated matching game should not depend on a particular matching rule, and universal equilibria satisfy this restriction (Kandori [15] , with new terminology.) This requirement also includes that the strategy must work for all population sizes, obviously desirable and relatively trivial if the strategy workds for all matching rules.
The e¤ect of these re…nements is to make social norms extremely simple strategies to follow. Given these restrictions a player can have any beliefs and know that the best thing for them to do is just follow the social standard of behavior. As long as all players act in their best interests, a given player does not need to know anything but the social status of the people she is interacting with today. All the rest will take care of itself.
The end result is a folk theorem that holds in any stage game that is not one of pure cooperation-the most general su¢cient condition for folk theorems in the standard repeated game (Abreu, Dutta and Smith [2] ). The results in Abreu et al. are more general because the minmax can be in mixed strategies, but this is not a great weakness in matching games where the option of not interacting is both in pure strategies and the minmax. It is also shown here that the folk theorem holds without correlated actions, and holds if payo¤s are slightly heterogenous.
The literature on repeated matching games was started by Rosenthal [20] and Rosenthal and Landau [21] . OFP [18] de…ne local information processing and show that with a continuum of players a trigger strategy can establish a folk theorem. Kandori [15] presents a folk theorem for many two player random matching games; de…nes the straightforward re…nement, and is the …rst to require universality.
Kandori [7] analyze what can be done with less information. In games with a dominant strategy and uniform matching these papers …nd that a "contagion" strategy sometimes works. The initial defection leads other players to defect, until everyone is playing the dominant strategy all of the time. This strategy works only if the population is small relative to players patience and requires that players have "too little" information.
Ahn and Suominen [3] and Hasker [14] have considered what happens if all information is generated through communication. Ahn and Suominen assume players talk to their neighbors (word of mouth). Those results are similar to Kandori [[15] Sect. 4] with all of the same restrictions. Hasker uses a stronger type of communication, and comes up with a more optimistic answer. In that paper if players can send costly messages (letters) to all other players then the folk theorem can be proven. The analysis is only for two player games, and the stage game must be neither one of pure con ‡ict or pure cooperation, but otherwise the results are the same as here.
Another related line of research is the limited information folk theorems. The classic problem in this literature is the imperfect private information problem. Kandori and Matsushima [16] prove a folk theorem in this setting using communication. They use noiseless communication to overcome the noisiness of the original observation. Ben-Porath and Kahneman [4] analyzes a situation where only some players observe what each player does. The motivating example is a large corporation where people only see others in their department. However, that result relies on public declarations and thus would not work in extremely large corporations. This paper shows that if players' payo¤s do not depend on people outside their division then there is a folk theorem appropriate for these corporations.
The next section of the paper presents the model. Following this the equilibrium condition is established. Next we illustrate the cost of local information processing by showing that trigger strategies and simple optimal penal codes are not equilibria in the repeated matching game. In this section a simple concrete random matching game is described-the Looped Townsend Turnpike. In section 5 the main theorem is presented. The theorem is also extended to the case where there is some heterogeneity between players, and the problems with mixed strategy equilibria are discussed.
A Description of the Model
In a matching game there are I populations each with the same number of members, which are at most countable. Call these populations P i i 2 f1; 2; 3; :::Ig, then a matching rule ¹ is a distribution over deterministic matching rules. A deterministic matching rule is a function Ã : P 1 ! £ I k=2 P k whose projection onto P k is one to one for all k 6 = 1. The players matched with player j are denoted ¹ (j), and when the group is matched they play a stage game. 1 Until subsection 4.3 in the stage game all that matters is a player's population, it does not matter which player is involved. This is also true about the strategy and many other times during our analysis. When this is true I will describe a player as i and it should be understood that I am speaking of an arbitrary member of population P i . When I need to speak of an individual I will refer to her as j. Thus in the stage game player i has a …nite action set, A i , and payo¤ function,
A player's own action will be written …rst in her payo¤ function, and the vector of actions taken by the other people in her group will be written as a ¹(i) 2 £ k6 =i A k . Without loss of generality (see corollary 2) players use correlated actions from the set A = ¢ (£A i ). In this paper the minmax is in pure strategies, call this strategy m i 2 £A k for population i and normalize payo¤s so that
Note that since we are discussing matching games players should have the option of not interacting, and thus the mixed strategy minmax is in pure strategies.
In a repeated matching game the interaction above will happen ad in…nitum, with players discounting their payo¤s between periods by ± 2 (0; 1). De…ne H t as the history of the entire game up to period t. This includes the actions of all players (and who they interacted with) in period 0 to t¡1. Then the matching rule in each period is determined by a matching regime ¹ r , thus if the set of matching rules is M, ¹ r :
A path is a sequence of action pro…les w = © a t ª 1 t=1 a t 2 A. Her payo¤ from such a path is her discounted value,
The equilibria will be social norms fZ; ¾; ¿ g. The social status of a player of population i in period t is denoted z t i 2 Z i : Z = £ I i=1 Z i is the set of social statuses, and it will be …nite. The social standard of behavior is a function from social status to action today, and is denoted ¾ :
It takes a player's social 1 An example of an interesting matching rule is to choose one population i 2 f1; 2; 3; :::Ig. Then choose players one at a time from this population and ask them to select one person from each of the other populations who is not already chosen. This matching rule is a model of employers hiring employees.
The inverse of this matching rule is also of interest. Select a player from all of the populations except 1 one at a time, and ask her which of the P1 she wants to be matched with among the j 2 P1 that are not already matched with someone of her population. This matching rule is a model of customers choosing a store to buy from. is the correct action given the outcome of the public randomization device. Note that these social norms use local information processing since ¿ is only a¤ected by
. When players use a social norm they are told z t ¹(i) after they are matched in period t. Social norms will have to be sequential equilibria and satisfy two other re…nements. De…ne F I t (X) as the state where the players in X know H t , and let Xjy be the variable X given that y occurred.
De…nition 1 An equilibrium is straightforward if given a matching regime, for all i and for all X µ [
otice that a sequential equilibrium must be a subgame perfect equilibrium if it is straightforward.
De…nition 2 An equilibrium is universal if it is an equilibrium for all matching regimes and population sizes.
To clarify some conventions and terminology, in this paper a standard repeated game means a repeated matching game where the same players are always matched together. In an abuse of terminology a random matching game is a repeated matching game where the matching regime is independent of the history of the game, and a repeated matching game is one where the matching regime can depend on history. When we refer to an equilibrium we mean a sequential equilibrium that satis…es straightforwardness and universality. A static Nash equilibrium is an equilibrium of the repeated matching game when the discount factor is zero. A strict path equilibrium is one where along all paths that can be reached after some H t the incentive to take the equilibrium action is met with a strict inequality.
Equilibrium Condition
In this section the most important re…nement is universality. The only e¤ect in this section of straightforward is that we don't need to worry about players' information sets or beliefs. Local information processing merely limits the type of social norms we must consider.
However, universality means that a "game" in this paper is equivalent to a large class of games in a standard analysis. In a standard analysis the matching regime and population size are part of the de…nition of the game. This means that usually the future is a unique path-at worst it has a unique expectation. Here there is no unique future, even in expectation.
One reason universality is required is because an analyst must frequently admit to uncertainty about the matching regime in a large repeated matching game. If he or she faces this uncertainty she will have to do analysis similar to that done here. Given that she must embark on this type of analysis, universality actually makes it as simple as possible. Otherwise he or she must worry about the population size and guess at the speci…c matching regimes she thinks possible. Under universality none of this matters. All that matters are the payo¤s of the stage game and the strategy-or the analysis is no more complex than the strategy.
To clarify exposition we will identify a player by her social status, or z t i 2 Z i for i 2 f1; 2; 3; :::Ig. Given this convention, we can de…ne the set of possible futures, W
1. h t;s be a continuation history for player z t i between period t and t+s s 2 f1; 2; 3; :::1g.
¹ Z t+s ¡i
¡ h t;s ¢ µ £Z l l 2 f1; 2; 3; :::Ig ni be the possible set of statuses in period t+ s given h t;s
It is de…ned given ¾ t i -the pure action z t i should take today, and a t i 2 A i -the action she actually takes.
Notice that this is independent of any given population. In essence since the population can be countable we can construct a large enough population that we can achieve this independence, as the following lemma proves.
Lemma 1 Assume fZ; ¿ ; ¾g is an equilibrium social norm, then the set of potential continuation paths is W
Proof. Given h t;s , there is a population size where for every z ¡i 2 ¹ Z t+s ¡i ¡ h t;s ¢ there can be I ¡ 1 players who have this vector of statuses. By de…nition every status in ¹ Z t+s ¡i ¡ h t;s ¢ can be reached by some sequence of play, thus every element can be achieved after a …nite number of deviations (in 0 to t ¡ 1) and matchings. Since ¹ Z t+s ¡i ¡ h t;s ¢ µ £ l6 =i Z l it is …nite, and so for a large enough population it is possible for every z ¡i 2 ¹ Z t+s ¡i ¡ h t;s ¢ to be the statuses of some I ¡ 1 players.
Second, the set of h t;s is …nite for every s. Since h t;1 is unique, and
Now since for each s it only requires a …nite population then for all s it only requires a countable population to make every continuation history h t;s is possible. Universal requires that the strategy is an equilibrium with a countable population. Universal also requires that we consider all matching regimes, thus the set of possible continuation histories is the set of the sequences
Remark 1 If we let the social status be a function of ¾ t i instead of only if a t i = ¾ t i then the above construction would depend on the population because ¾ would generate a distribution over all populations, and we would need a countable population to make sure all states in ¹ Z t+s ¡i ¡ h t;s ¢ happen each period.
may seem complex, except for very odd strategies this set will be …nite and analytically simple. Furthermore, the analyst only cares about one of the limiting elements of this set: either an element of w
In the next lemma we show that w
Lemma 2 Assume fZ; ¿ ; ¾g is an equilibrium, then w
Proof. De…ne z t+s i ¡ h t;s ¢ as player z t i 's status in period t+s given the history h t;s . Now consider an arbitrary sequence of paths fw°g is a convergent sequence and let
With these lemmas completed the equilibrium condition is immediate.
Proposition 1 A social norm is an equilibrium if and only if for all i 2 f1; 2; 3; :::Ig, for all
Proof. This condition is su¢cient since for any possible continuation path w,
, thus if´is a conditional probability over the set of continuation paths
. It is necessary since by lemma 1 every element of W ¡ z t i ; a t i ; ¾ t i ¢ must be considered. In words this states a strategy is an equilibrium if and only if it is when cooperation leads to the worst possible payo¤ and deviating is rewarded as much as possible. A reader may think that the condition is excessively restrictive. However, in the folk theorem section we will show a endogenous matching regime that actually achieves this, (subsection 4.1). Thus it is possible to give examples where this condition is binding. In fact, this example was developed after the equilibrium condition was established. It was easy to see that it failed the above condition, …nding a matching regime that generated these payo¤s required more thought.
Note that ¾ t i is compared with A i n¾ t i but not with itself. Upon inspection of the equilibrium condition the reason is transparent. In order for the inequality to be true when comparing ¾ t i with ¾ t i it must be that w
With such a strategy who a player meets with literally doesn't matter, for all w and w 0 in W
. Regardless of who she meets, a player's payo¤ is always the same. Of course if ¾ t i is a mixed strategy this condition must be satis…ed, which is why we do not consider such strategies.
The Cost of Local Information Processing.
In this section I will illustrate what assuming local information processing has cost the analysis. This cost will be illustrated with two negative results. First it will be proven that there are no trigger strategies which are equilibria. Second it will be shown that there is not always a simple optimal penal code. Thus the simplest equilibria and the analytically most important equilibria in a standard repeated game are lost.
The primary e¤ect of local information processing is that multiple deviations must now be considered. By local information processing a player's status can only be a¤ected by players she has interacted with in the past. This means that multiple people can deviate and all of them must be handled simultaneously. For trigger strategies this means players can have to punish forever independent of whether they cooperate today or not-thus they will defect. For simple optimal penal codes since each player already gets the worst equilibrium payo¤ after a deviation simultaneous deviations can give them a lower payo¤, and they will deviate again.
Of course both of these strategies would be equilibria if it was not for straightforwardness and universality. However as will be shown only weak versions of both of these re…nements are needed. It is the primary assumption that causes the failure.
The Failure of Trigger Strategies in Repeated Matching Games.
The trigger strategy is a classic strategy commonly used to prove folk theorems. In OkunoFujiwara and Postlewaite [18] it is used to prove the …rst folk theorem for random matching games. In that paper local information processing is assumed but equilibria are not straightforward or universal. In standard repeated games Friedman [9] proved the …rst folk theorem using trigger strategies. Later papers have used other strategies only to generalize his results. In contrast trigger strategies are not equilibria in repeated matching games.
The easiest way to understand this is to consider a concrete matching game, the Looped Townsend Turnpike-a modi…ed Townsend Turnpike (Townsend [22] ). Imagine there is a circular road, along this turnpike there are n restaurants at n di¤erent locations. There are n truckers that go around this turnpike, each going one restaurant forward each period and eating at each restaurant. Label the truckers c 2 f1; 2; 3; :::; ng and the restaurateurs r 2 f1; 2; 3; :::ng ; then in period t the restaurateurs' matching regime is ¹ t r = (t + r) mod n 2 .
The restaurateur can either produce high quality (H) or low quality (L) food, and the trucker can pay (P ) or not pay (N) before the quality is revealed. The normal form game is:
This is a prisoners dilemma where fP; Hg is the socially desirable outcome. 3 For a trigger strategy in this game let the set of social statuses be Z r = Z t = f0; 1g and everyone's initial status be zero. The transition rule is
The social standard of behavior is
2 where (t + r) mod n is the remainder of t+r n times n. 3 Note that cooperation due to the threat of personal enforcement will not work in large populations.
Personal enforcement requires ± n¸1 2 which will fail for all ± if n > ln 1
In this strategy a player is "good" if her status is zero. As long as her status is good she cooperates (sells high quality food or pays) with all good players she meets, otherwise she trusts no one (L or N).
Now in order to see why this is not an equilibrium, given ± choose k such that
This k is su¢cient so that if a trucker has to cooperate today and punish someone (play fN; Lg) for the next k periods she will cheat and play N today. In this matching game this means the next k restaurateurs have the bad status (z t r = 1). By universal, the strategy must be an equilibrium if the restaurateurs population is larger than k. For simplicity assume the next k restaurateurs deviate at once. By straightforward the critical trucker can know of these deviations and will defect-thus this strategy is not an equilibrium.
We could overcome this problem if we modi…ed trigger strategies so they were not absorbing state social norms.
De…nition 4
In an absorbing state social norm there is a social status z ¤ i i = f1; 2; 3; :::Ig after which a player who has status z ¤ i will never have her status changed in any future.
In fact no absorbing state social norms that satisfy two reasonable criteria are equilibria.
De…nition 5 A social norm is minimal if there is a …nite sequence of play such that every z i 2 Z i is the status of some player from population i at the end of this sequence of play.
De…nition 6 A social norm is time independent if Z is minimal and at any period t there is a …nite continuation sequence of play such that z i 2 Z i is the status of some player from population i at the end of this sequence of play.
Thus social norms that violate one of these criteria either have "wasted" social statuses ‡oating around, or have a …nite initial period in which the strategy is not an absorbing state social norm. Without loss of generality, assume that ¾ (z ¤ ) is a static Nash equilibrium each period. 4 Lemma 3 Assume fZ; ¿ ; ¾g is an equilibrium absorbing state social norm which is time independent, then for all
s a static Nash equilibrium. 4 Clearly a player with status z ¤ i must play a best response each period, and if there is such a status for every role then ¾ (z ¤ ) must be a nash equilibrium.
Proof. Assume ¾ (z 0 ) is not a static Nash equilibrium, and ¾ 1 (z 0 ) is not a best response. Then since the player of population 1 can be matched with a player with status z ¤ 2 from this period on, v
i´s ince if a player deviates today they can also be matched with the person with status z ¤ 2 . Thus the strategy is not an equilibrium. Notice that while it might be very complicated to get the status pro…les z 0 and z ¤ 2 the matching regime given these statuses is very simple. If z 0 is the initial status pro…le, all the matching regime has to be is "i went travelling for a while, and now she's coming back home." Furthermore, notice that she might be traveling for a very long time and if at any time she gets some news from home she will deviate before she returns. She only needs one piece of information, is it tenable to assume that she will never get it?
One possible response to this result is to point the …nger at universality. Certainly-one would argue-trigger strategies would work if the matching regime was "suitably di¤use." This is precisely the case that Kandori [7] analyze. OFP [18] actually assume a continuum of players, and then extend their argument to games with a large …nite population and a di¤use matching regime. Combined with this would have to be an argument that straightforward is too strong. Perhaps the weakest possible version would be that players only learn the social status of one player with probability " each period. But with an absorbing state social norm the information that someone has status z ¤ 2 is permanent, and this small " probability would build up enough information in …nite time.
Another weakening of straightforward brings out a di¤erent di¢culty with equilibria that violate this criteria. Assume that players only know the status of k other playerstheir "neighbors." In this case a strategy would have to be an equilibrium when a player knows that all k have defected, and thus their patience must be higher than in the standard repeated game. When straightforward is weakened we have to have players patient enough that their information doesn't matter, or they are more patient than informed.
A …nal response is that we aren't really interested in sequential equilibria, for large societies only equilibria where a small fraction of the population deviates should be of interest. The problem with this is that the matching regime must be di¤use. If there is a small group that matches primarily among themselves then the deviations in this neighborhood could spread. While a di¤use matching regime is a reasonable assumption if violations don't matter much, with strategies as susceptible to unraveling as absorbing state social norms the assumption is strong.
In Kandori [15] a re…nement not used here was required. This re…nement was global stability-given everyone follows the equilibrium strategy from any period on eventually the payo¤ will return to the initial path's payo¤. This restriction was intended to rule out "contagion" strategies-a type of absorbing state social norm. However these strategies are not equilibria because of local information processing and straightforwardness. Perhaps no assumptions make an absorbing state social norm a "reasonable" equilibrium of a repeated matching game.
3.2 A random matching game without a simple optimal penal code.
The simple optimal penal code (Abreu [1] ) is one of the seminal results in the literature of standard repeated games. The simple optimal penal code is de…ned by …nding the worst equilibrium path for each player. The set of these paths is the simple optimal penal code, and this code makes it easy to …nd all of the equilibria of the standard repeated game. If a path is an equilibrium, it is an equilibrium when after any deviation the continuation path is the worst equilibrium path for that player. Thus instead of …nding a potentially countable set of equilibria with one equilibrium you can …nd all of the others.
That this construction does not generalize to repeated matching games is not surprising. The result depends on the fact that in any history of the game there can be no more than one deviator that must be punished-simultaneous deviations are ignored. Local information processing makes this impossible in repeated matching games, and thus the result should not generalize. The simplicity of this intuition is best appreciated by analyzing an example. Consider the stage game: . This game has a unique worst equilibrium path for each player, which is (for i 2 fr; cg)
It can be easily veri…ed that if w (i) is both the initial path and the path after any deviation by either player then this is an equilibrium. It must be the worst since it's payo¤ is zero. The proof of uniqueness can be requested from the author.
To construct a social norm that uses the simple optimal penal code in this game, let the set of social statuses be Z r = Z c = f0; 1; 2g, write the transition rule as a two step function ¿ = f¿ n ; ¿ x g (for i 2 fr; cg)
e z t i else The social standard of behavior for any a is:
But this strategy is not an equilibrium independent of a. Note that:
since zero is the individually rational payo¤ the discounted payo¤ for player i can not decrease. Since ¼ i (H i ; H i ) is the highest possible payo¤ in the stage game, if player i receives ¼ i (M i ; M i ) today then she must receive ¼ i (H i ; H i ) forever in the future or she will deviate. Now assume that two random players r 1 and c 1 both deviated yesterday and will interact tomorrow. Since r 1 and c 1 will meet tomorrow it is impossible for both of them to expect to play fH i ; H i g tomorrow, and the simple optimal penal code is not an equilibrium. This result can be shown to hold for ± 2 i . Note how weak straightforward can be for this result to hold. If each player has an " > 0 chance of learning the social status of a random player the strategy will not be an equilibrium. Universal was hardly used at all, the matching regime only has to allow players who last period be matched next period.
The Folk Theorem
The folk theorem is fairly immediate given the equilibrium condition, the only remaining step is to describe the strategy. Before taking this step I will …rst show the e¤ect of endogenous matching regimes by example. This will be done by showing why the strategies used to prove the folk theorem in Kandori [15] are not equilibria with endogenous matching. This should explain to the reader two important facts. First why endogenous matching regimes matter. Second, why the equilibrium condition is binding. One might think that the matching regimes needed to achieve this must be extremely counter-intuitive, but in the following example the matching regime is based on a preference to reward people who haven't deviated. The only argument could be with the tie-breaking rule, which will be discussed.
The E¤ect of Choice Driven Matching.
Consider the following prisoner's dilemma:
The social statuses are Z r = Z c = f0; 1; 2g; the transition rule is: 
where r is a representative row player and c is a representative column player. Consider a matching game where there are two column players fc 1 ; c 2 g and two row players fr 1 ; r 2 g. The …rst priority of the matching rule will be to maximize the payo¤ of the column player with lowest status, and c 1 if z t c 1 = z t c 2 . When the column player is indi¤erent the tie breaking rule will be to interact with the row player who has deviated less, and if this fails then r 1 . Now consider a subgame where fc 2 ; r 1 ; r 2 g all deviated yesterday for the …rst time. If r 1 cooperates today then her payo¤ will be:
But if she deviates then tomorrow she will be matched with c 2 and her payo¤ is:
And she will deviate for all ± < 1. This counter example depends on the tie breaking rule, but is it unreasonable a priori? Unless one can reject the tie breaking rule out of hand, one needs to be concerned about what would happen if someone does use this rule. This was the reason universality was required in the …rst place-otherwise a social planner must play a guessing game about the matching regime when choosing a strategy. Notice the minor e¤ect of straightforwardness and how little choice was needed. All that is needed is that the matching game has more than four players, and that one player chooses using the speci…ed preferences. On the other side r 1 only has to know the social status of the people she may be matched with tomorrow, and this information with any positive probability.
The Primary Result.
The only restriction on the repeated matching games in the proof is that the stage game satis…es the non-equivalent utilities condition.
De…nition 7 A stage game satis…es non-equivalent utilities (NEU) if there is no i and
This condition is easily veri…able and weak, it fails only in games of pure coordination. Abreu, Dutta and Smith [2] prove a folk theorem for all standard repeated games that satisfy this, making it the weakest su¢cient condition in the literature.
However, unlike Abreu et al. [2] this folk theorem will only show that any payo¤ that dominates the minmax in pure strategies can be supported. This is a signi…cant restriction in standard repeated games, less so in matching games. Below I analyze this restriction and conjecture about how and when the folk theorem could be extended.
Abreu, Dutta and Smith show this is equivalent to the existence of asymmetric payo¤ points. These are action pro…les 
Given these conventions de…ne the action conditional on social status as:
and the social standard behavior
The transition rule is again de…ned using a two step function¿ = f¿ n ;¿ x g:
and z
for k 2 f1; 2; 3; :::; Ig ni
In this strategy anyone who deviates is punished for the next T periods and then always play a i . The critical di¤erence between this and Kandori's strategies is that players are forgiven if they interact with someone who deviated in the same-or later-period.
De…ne
Theorem 1 If the stage game satis…es the NEU conditions, then as ± ! 1; every a 0 2 A ++ can be supported as the equilibrium path of a social norm.
Proof. We will show there exists a ± such that if ±¸± a 0 is an initial equilibrium path supported by3,¿: We will …rst …nd player's worst continuation payo¤ given that they cooperate. When possible, we will then simplify our analysis by showing that one player's incentives are always worst than another's.
for all i. If a player has status zero her worst possible future is to punish someone for the next T periods playing m ¡i , and then play a ¡i forever. If a player's status is one there are two possibly worst futures: either the worst for status zero or to play a i forever.
for high enough ±, choose ± such that this condition is true for all i. Then playing a i forever is the worst possible future and a player with status zero will cooperate when a player with status one will. A player with status one will cooperate for high enough ± since
, thus choose ± such that for all i:
Finally, if a player's status is greater than one and ±¸± then she will cooperate if someone who's status is T will. This person will cooperate since 0 · ± T ¼ i ¡ a i ¢ . Just to be clear, this folk theorem satis…es all of the conditions in Kandori [15] is the continuation value in period t + s for player i. However this is easily satis…ed by the above strategy. All one has to do is have a player play a i for some T 1 < 1 periods and then revert to playing a 0 forever, thus this folk theorem weakens all of the restrictions of that folk theorem. Critically it holds for choice driven matching regimes, but it also holds for all I player games that satisfy the NEU condition.
At the same time it is almost as weak as Abreu, Dutta and Smith [2] . One di¤erence is that I always require the NEU condition. In two player games Fudenberg and Maskin [10] prove the folk theorem without the NEU condition. Abreu et al. show in general that if you can simultaneously minmax players then the NEU condition is not necessary. In these cases the strategy used punishes all people simultaneously, and this type of strategy will not work in repeated matching games.
Consider a subgame where person 1 deviated yesterday and must be punished, person 2 has never deviated but will be matched with person 1 tomorrow and forever in the future. If the game violates the NEU condition, then u 2 (a) = ®u 1 (a)+¯®¸0, to avoid degenerate utility functions assume ® > 0. This means that 2's continuation payo¤ can not be more than 1's. How do you punish 2 if they deviate today? If you use the same punishment path as for person 1, then the only di¤erence is the …rst period's payo¤. If you use a harsher punishment, then you are in the same situation next period with the roles of one and two reversed.
I have found that one can prove a folk theorem over the payo¤ space in two player games since the highest payo¤ must be a Nash equilibrium. The interested reader can request this proof from the author, but the general conjecture is that the folk theorem does not hold if the NEU condition is not satis…ed.
Durability to Payo¤ Perturbations.
The folk theorem as presented is missing one important characteristic of a matching game. Since players' payo¤s are the same regardless of who they are matched with they could do just as well by always interacting with the same people. The motivation of matching has to be that payo¤s depend on who one interacts with. In general, this would be a stochastic repeated matching game and this paper is not about stochastic games. While stochastic repeated games have been analyzed (Dutta [6] ) what can be done when stochastic payo¤s and matching are combined is uncertain and left for future research.
However, I will now present an environment where matching is bene…cial and the folk theorem holds. In this game we will only slightly perturb players' payo¤s. Enough so that there is a gain to matching, but not so much that the methods above don't work.
De…nition 8
In the perturbed repeated matching game fA i ; ¼ i ; ±g I i=1 for every player j of population i:
2 for all i 2 f1; 2; 3; :::Ig, t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g and ¹ j . Only player j knows ½ j (¢) though ¹ ½ is common knowledge.
Note that these payo¤s decrease if the frequency of interaction increases. There are several other normalizations that could be done. One could assume ¼ j (a) = ¼ i (a) + ½ j ³ a; ¹ j ; t´if players only knew the realizations of ½ j (¢) from t to t + s, s < 1, and the ½ j (¢; ¢; t) are iid.
Regardless of the normalization the intuition is the same. Assume ± is high enough such that there is a strict path equilibrium supporting a 0 in the unperturbed game. Since the equilibrium is strict, if the payo¤ from cooperating is decreased by " 2 and the payo¤ from cheating is increased by " 2 it will not a¤ect anyone's incentives. Thus their is a strategy supporting a 0 in the perturbed game for small perturbations.
Corollary 1 Given a 0 assume ± >± then there is a ½ ¤ such that if ¹ ½ · ½ ¤ there is an equilibrium of the perturbed repeated game that supports a 0 .
Proof. Clearly this perturbation can not increase someone's payo¤s by deviating by more than (1 ¡ ±) ¹ ½ 2 each period, also it can not reduce someone's payo¤ from cooperating by more than (1 ¡ ±) ¹ ½ 2 . Thus the total discounted e¤ect on both values can not be more than
and all equilibrium conditions will be satis…ed with at least weak inequality.
A Discussion of Mixed Strategy Equilibria.
Previously I mentioned that since matching games should include the possibility of not interacting the minmax will be in pure strategies-unlike in standard repeated games. However this is not the only reason that equilibria with a mixed strategy minmax-or other mixed strategies-should not be considered, here I wish to discuss a second problem with such equilibria. In general, the mixed strategy which minmaxes a given player is not a static Nash equilibrium. In the standard repeated game this is overcome by changing players' future payo¤s to make them just indi¤erent today. To achieve this indi¤erence in standard repeated games players must at least have common beliefs about each other's payo¤s for every future period. This is a palatable assumption in a standard repeated game where a group of players will interact forever, but in a repeated matching game two players could interact only once-is the assumption still palatable?
To achieve this indi¤erence in a repeated matching game means that in a large society all players have identical beliefs about the distribution of the ½ j ³ a; ¹ j ; t´for all j and all t. This assumption is equivalent to stating that you and all other people in your country have common beliefs about what each other's incomes are-furthermore for any future date everyone has common beliefs today about what the distribution will be then. Assuming player's payo¤s are independent of time and who is matched together is but a subtler version of assuming common beliefs over ½ j ³ a; ¹ j ; t´. And there is a second dimension to the problem. Since the matching regime might be a¤ected by a player's action it might depend on which action in the support of the mixed strategy is played. Thus a player must be indi¤erent over who they interact with. This problem is why every constant path social norm in the following stage game has a limiting average payo¤ of one.
A constant path social norm is one where given any history of play and 
this allows any actions in the next T periods but rules out strategies where the action pro…le cycles. The limiting average payo¤ is lim ±!1 (1 ¡ ±) v i . The proof can be requested from the author. Understanding what can be done with social norms that are not constant path will provide insight on how to prove the folk theorem with a mixed strategy minmax. In the proof the reason that all lower payo¤s fail is that a player could learn step by step that they will have to minmax forever. Say that i is minmaxing today. She looks around and notices that if she plays the wrong action in the mixed strategy then tomorrow she will have to minmax. In order to get her indi¤erent between this action and her others she will have to be rewarded if she minmaxes tomorrow. Tomorrow the same thing happens, and soon enough the reward she must be promised can not be delivered.
With cyclical equilibria we can stop this chain of reasoning. In essence, players cycle between the payo¤ one is interested in and a strict Nash equilibrium. After this phase if a column player has to punish a row player by mixing all previous changes in payo¤ are wiped out. In essence, since strategies that use a mixed punishment in every period are impossible you mix these strategies with static Nash equilibria. As ± ! 1, the frequency of this "silent period" can decrease and any payo¤ on the interior of the payo¤ space may be achievable. The author conjectures the folk theorem can be proven at least in games with I Nash equilibria if each population's payo¤ is minimized on a di¤erent equilibrium.
However, as mentioned before the author does not think mixed strategy equilibria exist in any reasonable model that is closer to reality. While a model should be an abstraction if including an important and minimal realistic element changes results drastically then results are suspect. The equilibria in this paper stand up to this criterion, the author does not think mixed strategy equilibria do.
The Folk Theorem without Correlated Actions.
A …nal point is that the folk theorem does hold without correlated actions. Since correlating devices are not commonly observed some feel assuming one is a strong assumption. The author would like to point out that Francois Forges [8] did show that players who can play a mixed strategy can create a correlating device (with communication) but would also like to show that the folk theorem holds without this assumption 5 . Fudenberg and Maskin [11] showed that correlated actions can be used without loss of generality in standard repeated games, but one can not automatically assume the proof extends. The di¢culty is that without correlated actions the matching regime can give a player a lower payo¤ than the payo¤ of any given correlated action, and one must show that these lower payo¤s are su¢cient for players to be willing to cooperate. Thus the following corollary is included to assure the reader that Fudenberg and Maskin's construction can be extended. For simplicity we will not present detailed strategies, just show that it is possible to construct such strategies.
Corollary 2 (Puri…cation of Correlated Actions) For any correlated action pro…le a 0 2 A such that ¼ i (a) > 0 for all i there exists a± and a path w 0 = matching game is committed and people's payo¤s are not too heterogenous, people never need to know anything except the social status of the person they are interacting with. They can blithely live their lives knowing that whatever happens they should just do as they are told. Thus these equilibria require a minimal amount of computation.
At the same time the generality of the conclusions can seem troubling. After all this analysis shows that if players are patient enough then anything can happen. They don't even have to interact with the same people-one testable restriction in most previous analysis. The author thinks this impression is false. This paper does not prove that societies can cooperate arbitrarily, it shows that they can if they have a well developed mechanism. It should be clear that if the analyst can not point to the mechanism then this paper says nothing. Identifying and understanding the mechanism is an appropriate goal for empirical analysis of social norms. What is indicated is that the mechanism does not have to be run by some government agency, in fact it can be very informal. Examples that illustrate this point abound. Udry [23] found that rural Nigerians did not su¤er from credit shortages because they used an informal information network to overcome the moral hazard problem. Greif [12] showed that the Maghibiri traders used a more formalized networkwith a centralized information depository-to enable shipping across the Mediterranean during the Middle Ages. Milgrom, North and Weingast [17] found an explicit mechanism in the Champagne fairs. The fairs operated as quality guarantor by banning anyone accused of not trading fairly. Thus they helped trade ‡ourish at the beginning of the Renaissance. In the political science literature Ostrom [19] and others have been extensively studying modern social norms used to overcome public good problems. This literature can also contribute to the theoretic literature by examining how these social norms develop. Ostrom [19] and Greif [13] have done analysis of this type.
The theory of social norms currently has several signi…cant issues that should be addressed. One is allowing for more heterogeneity. Obviously heterogeneity is important for matching games and the amount allowed for here is much less than the amount observed. Dutta [6] has established a folk theorem with weak conditions for stochastic repeated games. While it would perhaps be simple to combine a stochastic game and a matching game, it might be harder to satisfy a condition similar to universality. However the motivation for this is as strong as for universality, one can not expect the analyst and the players of the game to know all the details of other players' payo¤s. Another problem is that the analysis does not allow for free exit. Free entry can easily be dealt with by the universal restriction, but exit can not be allowed. Empirically this is an important subject, Ostrom [19] …nds that limiting free exit is one indicator of a successful social norm. Understanding this point theoretically would be bene…cial. A related question is what happens if there are competing social norms?
This paper has developed the understanding of cooperative behavior in market interactions. Many market interactions have their element of moral hazard or agency, and a general theory of how these problems are overcome has long been needed. The traditional solution is to rely on courts, but what if these institutions do not function properly or do not exist? Is the economy dependent on them? The theoretical and empirical literature suggest not; an understanding of this point should be developed.
